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Contract Enforcement: A Political Economy Model of
Legal Development
Fali Huang*
Singapore Management University
In an effort to understand why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts
differs across societies, this article builds a political economy model of legal
development where legal quality of contract enforcement is a costly public
good. It finds that legal investment tends to be too small under elite rule but
too large under majority rule in comparison with the socially optimal level.
Furthermore, elite rule, low legal quality, and high-income inequality may form
a self-perpetuating circle that hinders economic development. In contrast to the
conventional view, this article suggests that the often-observed association
between heavy reliance on relational contracts and under development is
most likely caused by the presence of elite rule rather than by a more collec-
tive-oriented culture per se because it is optimal for societies better at using
relational contracts to start legal investment relatively late and to have lower
quality of legal enforcement. (JEL O1, K49, H40, C72)
1. Introduction
Most economic transactions are prone to the risk of default by contracting
partners, even though it is collectively beneﬁcial for all relevant parties to
act honestly. Understanding how to optimally manage such risk is thus essen-
tial to achieve efﬁcient outcomes from voluntary exchanges. This problem is as
old as human society and may become more severe over time as growing
specialization in the economy generates more frequent and complex economic
exchanges among agents. Various institutions have been created to solve this
problem. A common enforcement method across different societies is to engage
in bilateral relational contracts where a future stream of beneﬁts is large enough
to prevent short-sighted cheating today. In a multilateral environment such as
a close-knit ethnic group or a social community, credible information of ones
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past behaviors can be circulated at a low cost so that individual reputations can
be developed and punishment carried out at the communal level. When it
becomes more productive to trade with strangers outside ones community,
the legal system is often relied upon to enforce contracts at the society level.
These different contract enforcement institutions have comparative advan-
tages over each other and thus usually coexist in many societies.1 Their relative
usage, however, differs across societies in an important way. The prevalence of
legal contracts is typically associated with well-developed economies (such as
the West), which exhibit high-quality legal systems and democratic political
regimes, whereas a heavy reliance on informal relationships such as kinship
and social communities is associated with developing countries that have the
opposite characteristics.2 Such stylized differences lead naturally to the con-
jecture that a collective-oriented culture, which (in contrast to an individual-
istic culture) seems inherently prone to the usage of relational contracts, is the
culprit behind both low legal quality and slow economic development (Weber
1954; North 1991; Greif 1994, 2006; North et al. 2000, 2009). This may be true
for some countries;3 it is, however, difﬁcult to reconcile with the experiences
of recently developed East Asian economies under Confucian culture, namely
Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Landa 1981; Whyte 1996;
Reed 2001).
This article develops a political economy model of legal development to ac-
count for why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts differs across
societies.4 It ﬁnds that the existence of strong social networks per se (which is
more likely in a collective culture) does not necessarily reduce overall welfare,
though it may slow down the legal development process, since relational con-
tracts have a comparative advantage in such an environment.5 However, if the
intensive usage of relational contracts is accompanied by elite rule, then legal
1. See, for example, Landa (1981), Ellickson (1991), Bernstein (1992), Greif (1994, 2006),
Whyte (1996), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005), and Dixit (2009).
2. See North (1991), McMillan and Woodruff (1999), North et al. (2000), Fafchamps (2002),
Johnson et al. (2002), and Greif (2006).
3. Latin America, for example, seems to ﬁt these stylized facts. Compared with North America,
the culture in Latin America is more collective-oriented (Portes 1994; North et al. 2000); the usage
of informal contracts in Latin America is much higher, whereas the legal quality, the degree of
institutionalized democracy during 1950–1995, the per capita GNP, and the average schooling
level are much lower (De Soto 1989; Botero et al. 2004); the income inequality in Latin America
is almost the highest among all countries (United Nations 2005).
4. Legal quality in this article refers not to the general quality of the legal system but only to the
speciﬁc legal institutions that concern contract enforcement. Following related economics liter-
ature, the term ‘‘contract’’ in this article refers to any mutual agreement between relevant parties,
where a ‘‘relational contract’’ is not backed up by law in any substantial sense and thus has to rely
exclusively on beneﬁcial future dealings to prevent cheating. In comparison, legal contracts rely
explicitly on the third party, namely legal courts, for enforcement, even though future dealings or
a relational aspect may still play some implicit role in mitigating cheating; this is consistent with
the observation that in reality the relational aspect of exchange is also relied upon by those who use
legal contracts (Macaulay 1963).
5. East Asia seems to ﬁt this case compared with the benchmark case of the developedWestern
countries.
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quality is most likely to be inefﬁciently low, while income inequality is likely to
be inefﬁciently high, both of which may hinder economic development. In other
words, the presence of elite rule is a much stronger indicator than social structure
or cultural orientation in assessing whether less reliance on legal contract en-
forcement is a barrier to economic development. In contrast, intensive reliance
on legal contract enforcement is not necessarily welfare improving, especially
when legal quality is determined by majority rule.6
Legal investment is treated in this article as a costly public good, whose
provision is to a large degree determined by the amount of beneﬁts resulting
from using legal enforcement instead of relational contracts as well as by the
political regime.7 The analysis shows that relational contracts secure cooper-
ation by promising future gains in an established relationship; the need to stay
with current partners, however, makes individuals reluctant to do business with
new partners even though they are more productive than the old ones. In con-
trast, legal contracts use an impersonal third party, the legal court, to deter
cheating, and thus free agents from the burden of maintaining less productive
relationships.8 As a result, the more productive new matches are relative to old
ones, the higher the returns of using legal enforcement, and the larger the
incentives to invest in the legal system.9
6. Magee et al. (1989) using data for about 35 countries show that a relatively large proportion of
lawyers in a countrys white-collar labor force leads to signiﬁcant declines in economic performance
(measured byGNP growth over the period 1960–80). Similar results are found byMurphy et al. (1991)
based on amuch larger data set. And it is well known that the number of lawyers per capita in the US is
one of the highest in the world; there is also evidence that Americans collectively spend twice asmuch
on civil litigation than they spend on new automobiles—more than any other industrialized country
(Baye et al. 2005).
7. It is useful to note that, while informal contract enforcement at individual and communal
levels seems to have been functioning spontaneously from early on, legal enforcement appears
much later in history, and in general it needs intentional public investment to be established (Greif
2002, 2005). For instance, the establishment of legal courts, the development of legal codes and
procedures, the training of judges, lawyers, and the police force are all needed for the legal system
to work (Hadﬁeld 2005).
8. This captures the insightful observation of Johnson et al. (2002): ‘‘Trust in existing suppliers
may make entrepreneurs reluctant to purchase from new suppliers. . . . The development of legal
institutions brings indirect efﬁciency gains, by lowering entry barriers, in addition to direct
efﬁciency gains through strengthening conﬁdence in contracts.’’
9. It is useful to keep in mind that the relationship between relational contracts and legally
enforced ones is much richer and more complicated than the model can capture. For example,
in reality the relational aspect of exchange is also relied upon by those who use legal contracts
(Macaulay 1963), which is also true in the model, and some legal rules may enhance the usage of
relational contracts. However, such richness of mutual inﬂuence becomes much less salient than
their distinction when one compares across societies where their relative usage varies dramatically.
For example, settling disputes through a legalistic, adjudicatory system never became rooted in
Chinese thinking, where for several thousand years the traditional perception was that the law was
primarily criminal and thus going into litigation was perceived as a disgraceful and humiliating
process that should be avoided at all costs; as a result, contract law was ignored throughout Chinese
legal history until recently (Peng 2000). As the main purpose of this article is to understand cross-
society variation in the usage of legal contract enforcement, such abstraction of the distinction
between relational and legal enforcement seems to be warranted, otherwise we may get lost in
details and miss the big picture.
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A direct implication is that a society would start to invest in legal enforce-
ment only when the beneﬁts of doing so become high enough relative to the
default choice of using relational contracts. So across societies, those more
suitable for the usage of relational contracts (e.g., those with a more homo-
geneous population, better organized communities, or a collective culture)
tend to start legal investment late and have lower legal quality. In other words,
the socially optimal pace of legal development may vary across societies
because the comparative advantages of relational contract enforcement may
differ due to exogenous reasons. This suggests that a higher quality legal
system is not always better for development, and a collective culture is not
necessarily bad.
When individuals have heterogeneous returns and thus conﬂicting interests
in improving legal quality, a political economy model is needed to examine
how legal investment is determined. Speciﬁcally, this article observes that the
traditional rich elite, who by deﬁnition are richer than others at times when
legal contract enforcement is not available or weak, must have enjoyed higher
gains in using relational contracts.10 But this means they would beneﬁt rela-
tively less from legal enforcement, whereas the less privileged masses stand to
gain more from having a competent legal system.11,12 So it is not surprising
to see that, if the rich elite are politically dominant and choose legal investment
10. Mapping from theory to reality, it is useful to note that the traditional elite are often
endowed with land and other natural resources, which are relatively stable sources of income,
and thus their major business transactions are conducted mostly through relational contracts with
similar elite families (Adams and Brownsword 2007; North et al. 2009).
11. This result is consistent with the comment of Pipes (1995:289): ‘‘Those in power have no
need of courts and laws to have their way; it is the poor and the weak who do. Anyone who doubts
this proposition has only to compare the general condition and the sense of security of the lower
orders in areas with weak legal traditions, as for example south-east Asia, with those like western
Europe and the United States where they are deeply entrenched.’’ The claim that the masses in
general have more to gain from a competent legal system compared with a dysfunctional one than
the elite is not contradictory to the observation that a poor individual may beneﬁt less than an elite
even in a highly developed legal system.
12. Note that the elite are composed of a rich minority, whereas the masses that favor legal
enforcement are the majority of the population and not necessarily the poorest sector of a society.
For example, North et al. (2009:93) estimate that the landed elite group in England was only about
0.5%–1% of the whole population between 1200 and 1600, which implies that the masses con-
tained at least 99% individuals in society. On a related note, legal enforcement in the model pro-
posed in the present article comes not from litigation per se but, instead, from its absence, because
in the equilibrium everyone cooperates and thus there is no need to have resort to litigation. In other
words, the implicit background role of law is muchmore crucial for legal enforcement to work than
expensive litigation, which occurs only off the equilibrium path and thus should be relatively rare.
Having said that, it must be acknowledged that the ability to defend ones interests in litigation
when it indeed happens remains important. Though conceptually the masses must have adequate
access to the legal system for any law to be effective, which is also feasible, whether this is actually
achieved is an important condition for the mechanism of the model to work. In this regard, even in
the context of litigation, many cases are settled and cases that in fact go for full trial are, to that
extent, relatively rare. Finally, the availability of legal aid and (in certain countries at least) con-
tingency fee or conditional fee arrangements do mitigate (to some extent at least) the problem of
costs and the concomitant obstacles with regard to access to justice.
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to maximize their own welfare, legal development tends to be slower than the
socially optimal level, whereas the opposite is true if the masses are politically
dominant. In other words, legal investment tends to be too large under majority
rule and too small under elite rule, and thus legal quality is often higher in
democratic societies than in others.
Another ﬁnding is that income inequality falls when legal quality improves;
the reason is that a better legal system, by providing all agents with more equal
access to new trade opportunities, makes the quality of their initial matches and
endowment less important and thus dampens the income gaps between the
traditional elite and the rest.13 Furthermore, the links between elite rule,
low legal quality, and high inequality can be mutually reinforcing when
the political power of a group is affected by its collective economic strength
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, 2005).14
This article contributes to the literature of contract enforcement institutions
by formally endogenizing legal quality in a political economy model of legal
development.15 Many studies examine comparative advantages of different
enforcement institutions and how they may be affected by exogenous
changes.16 Though the endogenous determination of enforcement institutions
is also featured in a few studies, the focus and approach are different in this
article. For example, Greif (2005) stresses the importance of coercive con-
straint institutions, whereas this article adopts a different angle by examining
the effects of heterogeneous returns among agents from using relational and
legal contracts.17
From a broader perspective, this article is also connected to studies dem-
onstrating the harmful effects of high income-inequality on institutions, where
the privileged elite shape institutions to suit their narrow interests.18 This
13. This is consistent with the positive correlation between high-income inequality and inten-
sive usage of informal relational contracts (Chong and Gradstein 2007b).
14. In this case, we have a self-perpetuating circle of economic, political, and legal conditions:
A highly unequal endowment distribution gives rise to elite rule, which slows down the legal
development, and low legal quality in turn helps preserve high-income inequality. Similar argu-
ments suggest the existence of the opposite circle containing low-income inequality, democracy,
and high legal quality.
15. SeeMacLeod (2007) and Dixit (2009) for systematic surveys and synthesis of related work.
16. Examples include better legal quality (Cooter and Landa 1984; Sobel 2006; Besley and
Ghatak 2009), expanding trade (Dixit 2003; Greif 2006), access to market (Kranton 1996a)
and ﬁnancial crisis (Li 2003).
17. Besley and Ghatak (2009) introduce a costless legal reform by the social planner to enhance
the use of formal collateral, whereas Dhillon and Rigolini (2011) endogenize enforcement insti-
tutions by allowing ﬁrms to bribe legal courts and consumers to share information. To the best of
my knowledge, I am not aware of similar attempts to use a political economy model to study legal
development in the legal scholarship; for a possible explanation see, for example, Harris (2003).
18. See, for example, Glaeser et al. (2003), Sonin (2003), Hoff and Stiglitz (2004), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006b, 2008), Chong and Gradstein (2007a).
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article differs from these studies in several aspects. First, a key difference is in
the exact source of inefﬁciency. A common result in the related literature is
that the rich elite can take advantage of lawlessness by engaging in rent-
seeking activities or corruption, which gives rise to economic stagnation
and inefﬁcient institutional change. In this article, the inefﬁciency is not caused
by rent-seeking activities, but by genuine differences in beneﬁts from improv-
ing legal quality, where the traditional elite have comparative advantages in
using relational contracts.19 Second, and more importantly, this leads to a new
insight that has not been noticed in the literature: Inefﬁcient legal development
not only occurs under elite rule but also happens under majority rule; that is,
while elite-ruled societies tend to under-invest in legal contract enforcement,
democratic societies tend to overinvest in it.20 Finally, none of these studies
endogenizes the development of legal contract enforcement or examines its
relationship with relational contracts and social communities.
This article proceeds as follows. The political economy model is set up in
the next section. Relational and legal contracts are analyzed in section 3,
whereas legal quality is endogenized in section 4. Some extensions and
relevant examples are provided in section 5. The ﬁnal section concludes
the article. All technical proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
There is a continuum of agents with a unit mass who live inﬁnitely. A small
proportion r of agents are the elite, each endowed with wealthwe and education
he, while the others belong to the masses, each endowed with a smaller wealth
wm and lower education hm, where we > wm > 0 and he > hm > 0.
The model contains two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the legal quality q of
contract enforcement is determined through a political process; it is taken
as given in the second phase, when agents match with each other into pair-
wise partnerships to carry out projects.
Legal Investment. The legal quality q of contract enforcement is chosen to
maximize the total welfare of the politically dominant interest group, whereas
the cost is equally shared among all agents. The cost function of legal invest-
ment is CðqÞ; where C#ðqÞ > 0 and C$q > 0. Without any investment, the
initial legal quality is zero. The cost of improving legal quality is presumably
composed of writing the legal rules and training judges, lawyers, the police
19. The point that the rich can do better in relational contracts is not new; Banerjee and
Newman (1993), for example, provide a mechanism linking relational contracts and inequality;
they do not, however, consider the political economy of contract enforcement as this article does.
20. A case of overusing legal contract enforcement is shown in Kranton and Swamy (1999),
and in general, it seems to be consistent with the recent evidence of declining social capital in the
US (see, among others, Putnam 1995 and Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005). Though potential draw-
backs of democracy in comparison to oligarchy are also discussed in Acemoglu (2008), the bad
result there is higher taxes, a well-known consequence under majority rule, not the inefﬁciency of
institutions as highlighted in this article.
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force, etc. Though these details are not explicitly modeled in the article, their
overall effectiveness is indicated by q.
Repeated Matching Game. The second phase of the model can be described
as a repeated matching game.21 Agents match with each other to play a two-
player repeated game, which can be interpreted as engaging in a business part-
nership. In each period, a match continues if both players agree to participate,
and it breaks up if either one wishes to do so.
Stage Game. In a match, agents play the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) described
in Table 1. When both agents cooperate in the project, each gets a return of
a > 0, which represents the gains from trade for both players. If one agent
cooperates but the other defects, the cooperator gets a negative payoff
d < 0 whereas the cheater gets a higher return aþ b, where b > 0 represents
the temptation of cheating; cheating is bad for the total surplus, which is cap-
tured by the assumption 2a > aþ b d > 0. If both agents defect, then each
gets a return of zero, which is the normalized return of going autarky.
Return on Learning in Established Matches. After a partnership is formed
for some time, the gains from trade may be improved through learning-by-
doing, and the improvement scale increases in the education levels of the
two partners. In particular, the return from the partnership becomes
að1þ gðh1; h2ÞÞ from the second period onward after the partnership is
formed, where g1, g2 > 0 and g12  0. So agents prefer to have a more edu-
cated partner, which will lead to perfect sorting such that elite agents match
among themselves, as do nonelite agents.22 It is thus useful to denote
ge[gðhe; heÞ and gm[gðhm; hmÞ; it is clear that ge > gm holds based on the
properties of gðh1; h2Þ and he > hm. Since the temptation of cheating remains
b as before, the payoff for the cheater in the stage game becomes að1þ giÞ þ b
in an established match where i 2 fe;mg.
Increase in Outside Opportunities. In each period, the gains from trade in
a new match stay the same at a with probability q, where q 2 ð0; 1Þ. With
probability 1 q, there is an exogenous shock that increases the gains from
trade for newly formed partnerships from a to að1þ eÞ for the ﬁrst N periods,
where e > 0, after which the gains from trade go back to normal; that is, they
Table 1. The Stage Game: A Prisoner’s Dilemma
Agent 2
Cooperate Defect
Agent 1 Cooperate (a, a) (d, a þ b)
Defect (a þ b, d) (0, 0)
21. Some parts of this repeated game are similar to Sobel (2006).
22. This is meant to capture the privileges enjoyed by the elite; alternative ways of modeling,
for example, by assuming that the elite have better connections or own better projects, would yield
similar results.
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become að1þ giÞ. This is meant to capture the inﬂuence of new trading
opportunities that are exogenously determined and beyond the control of
agents, where e indicates the surplus from outside opportunities that cannot
be reaped if one stays in the old partnership. Without much loss of generality,
we assume N ¼ 1 to simplify the analysis.23 As the shocks do not change the
temptation of cheating b, the payoff for cheating in the stage game becomes
að1þ eÞ þ b when the gains from trade are að1þ eÞ.
Information. There is no information transmission across matches. Agents
know the quality of their current match and the past actions of their own and
their partners within the matches. They cannot access information about the
past actions of any other agents. Since the population of agents is large, we
neglect the possibility that any two agents have met before. Unmatched agents
can ﬁnd a new partner without cost.24
Strategy and Equilibrium. In each period of a match, an agents strategy
speciﬁes an action in the above PD game, that is, to cooperate or to defect,
followed by a decision on whether to continue or to terminate the partnership.
Agents choose strategies to maximize the discounted sum of their stage-game
payoffs, net of contracting costs, if any, where the common discount factor is
d 2 ð0; 1Þ: This article focuses on subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) out-
comes, where an agent discontinues a partnership only if doing so gives
him a better payoff than otherwise.
Relational Contract. In particular, we study two types of enforcement insti-
tutions (which are SPEs) that enable agents to cooperate. One is a long-term
relational contract that demands both agents to always cooperate and to con-
tinue the partnership regardless of exogenous shocks, and if any agent defects,
it dissolves automatically at no cost to either agent. To deter cheating, each
agent in the partnership has to incur a sunk cost R up-front, which cannot be
recovered once the relationship stops.25 The expenditure R can be interpreted
as the cost of building the relationship, such as exchanging gifts or bonds, or
spending time and resources participating in social activities, which are quite
common procedures for initiating business relationships in many societies.
This means that, if an agent breaks the current partnership and forms
a new one with a stranger, he must pay R again for the new partnership,
otherwise he has to face the risk of being cheated.
Legal Contract. The other type of enforcement is to sign a short-term formal
legal contract that mandates cooperation during the match and punishes cheat-
ing but allows agents to break up when a new match becomes more
23. Assuming N > 1 or N ¼ þN will not change the main qualitative results.
24. When there is an endogenous matching cost, the qualitative results remain unchanged (see
Sobel 2006). The information transmission assumption will be relaxed in section 5.2 when social
communities are discussed.
25. The observation that imposing costs at the beginning of a relationship can lead to efﬁciency
gains is also made by Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) and Kranton (1996b).
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productive.26 If a pair of players each takes a cost c to write a contract, the court
identiﬁes cheating when it occurs with probability Qðc; qÞ; where q denotes
legal quality as already mentioned. The related cost of writing and using legal
contracts includes, for example, the effort to specify and follow appropriate
procedures in order to produce adequate evidence for the legal court to verify
whether cheating has happened and to carry out a possible remedy for breach;
a higher cost may imply a greater amount of documents or information to be
presented or exchanged before payment is to be made or goods are to be
delivered, which should increase the probability of breach being veriﬁed
and punished by the legal court. Similarly, such a probability is also higher
when the legal system is more effective. So we assume Qc;Qq > 0,
Qcq  0, and Qð0; qÞ ¼ Qðc; 0Þ ¼ 0. When cheating is veriﬁed by the court,
the defector has to give his unjust gain, the payoff að1þ sÞ þ b, to his partner,
where s 2 f0; g; eg indicates the three possible levels of productivity in
a partnership.27
Timing. The timing of this repeated game can be summarized as follows.
Players form pairs with each other through random matching within their
respective groups and, subject to mutual agreement, partners choose to adopt
either a relational contract or a legal contract, and then behave accordingly.
A match breaks up automatically once unexpected cheating occurs or at least
one player decides to dissolve it. Players exiting from an old relationship form
new matches and then the same action sequence described above follows.
3. Relational and Legal Contracts
The model is analyzed using backward induction. This section focuses on the
second phase of the model, namely the repeated matching game, while taking
the legal quality q as given; it examines how agents adopt different contracts
that are indeed subgame perfect equilibria under certain conditions.
3.1 Long-Term Relational Contracts
Suppose a pair of type i agents, where i 2 fe;mg, choose a long-term relational
contract that does not dissolve due to exogenous shocks. Since the relational
contract demands cooperation in all periods, where the return is a in the ﬁrst
period and að1þ giÞ afterward, the value of such a new match to each partner
is denoted by Vyi where
26. In addition to these two types of contracts that are the focus of this article, it is possible to
have other contract formats such as short-term relational contracts and long-term legal contracts,
which are, however, less commonly used. An earlier version of this article includes them and the
main results are similar. It is also useful to clarify that though strong words like ‘‘cheating’’ and
‘‘punishment’’ used in this article are applicable in the context of a PD, in other cases of contract
law they should be read as ‘‘breach of contract’’ and ‘‘remedy’’ that carry no moral judgment.
27. This remedy for breach is a restitutionary award to the innocent party (Furmston 2006).
Other reasonable assumptions about the courts decision, such as the usual expectation damage
measures or a reliance measure, will not alter the main results.
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Vyi ¼ aþ dað1þ giÞ
1 d :
Similarly, when the initial gain from trade is að1þ eÞ followed by periods with
a return of að1þ giÞ, the value of a new match is denoted by Vni, where
Vni ¼ Vyi þ ae holds. To prevent cheating, both agents have to incur a relation-
ship-building cost Ri, which turns out to be the same regardless of the level of
the initial returns.
Let’s check possible one-shot deviations when the initial gain from trade is
a. Deviations may happen either in a new match or when the match becomes
established. In a new match, a player gets Vyi  Ri if he cooperates; if he
defects, his payoff is aþ b Ri þ dEVi, where aþ b is the current payoff
from defecting, and the continuation value EVi[qVyi þ

1 qVni  Ri is
obtained by forming a new match in the next period: with probability q,
the gain from trade remains the same so the net value of a new match is again
Vyi  Ri, whereas with probability 1 q the gain from trade increases to
að1þ eÞ so the value of a new match is Vni  Ri. Cheating is not proﬁtable
when cooperation yields a higher return than defecting, which is the case when
Ri  b=d agi þ ð1 qÞae ð1Þ
holds. It can be shown that this same condition also prevents cheating in an
established partnership and when the initial gain from trade is að1þ eÞ.28
To maximize the net value of the match, the relationship-building cost
should be set at
R*i [ b

d agi þ

1 qae; ð2Þ
which is obtained from equation (1) at equality, and no agent has any incentive
to defect. R*i is thus the minimum cost of using the long-term relational con-
tract to achieve cooperation. It is larger when the temptation of cheating b is
higher, when agents are less patient (i.e., when d is lower), when the old part-
nership is less productive (gi lower), and when outside opportunities are better
(ae higher) and arrive more frequently ðð1 qÞ largerÞ.
Another condition for the long-term relational contract to be a SPE is that it
must be desirable to continue the old match even when a new match becomes
more productive. The net value of starting a new match is Vni  R*i when the
gain from trade is að1þ eÞ, while the value of continuing with the old match is
að1þ giÞ=ð1 dÞ. So it is optimal for agents to keep the old match when
a

1þ gi

1 d  Vni  R*i , which implies
ae%R*i þ agi: ð3Þ
This condition says that, when the productivity increase in new trade oppor-
tunities (indicated by ae) is not large enough to compensate for the loss of
productivity gain (agi) from learning-by-doing in the old match and the cost
28. The formal proof is in the Appendix.
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(R*i ) of building a new relationship, it is optimal to stay in the current match.
When R*i is replaced by equation (2), this condition becomes
e%b=dqa;
where b=dqa is the threshold level of productivity shock, below which neither
type of agent has an incentive to dissolve the match. Thus, we have proved the
following results.
Lemma 1When outside opportunities are low ðe%b=dqaÞ, the long-term
relational contract is a SPE for both elite and nonelite agents, whereas
the elite beneﬁt more from using relational contracts than the others (i.e.,
Vye  R*e> Vym  R*m).
This lemma suggests that it is optimal for agents to engage in long-term
relational contracts as long as the productivity gains in new trade opportunities
are not too large compared with the forgone return on learning in an established
match and the new relationship-building cost. And by having higher returns in
established partnerships ðge > gmÞ, the elite have larger gains from using long-
term relational contracts than the others.
3.2 Short-Term Legal Contracts
Suppose a pair of agents of type i 2 fe;mg choose to adopt a short-term legal
contract that punishes cheating but allows agents to break up at the beginning
of a period when a new match is more productive. Let Vˆyi and c
*
i denote,
respectively, the value and the optimal cost of using a legal contract to deter
cheating when the initial return is a. Using similar arguments as in the above
analysis of relational contracts to check for one-shot deviations, we get the
following results.
Lemma 2 The optimal legal cost c*i is higher when the legal quality q is
lower and when the established match is less productive (gi is lower),
whereas it is independent of outside opportunities e.
Note that, while the relationship-building cost R*i increases with new trade
opportunities e, the cost c*i of using legal contracts is independent of it because
legal enforcement allows the old match to dissolve once a new match becomes
more productive. In other words, agents adopting short-term legal contracts do
not need to face the pressure of maintaining the relatively less productive old
match.
For a short-term legal contract to be a SPE, it must be desirable to break up
the old match when a new match becomes more productive, which is indeed
true when
ae  c*ni þ agi ð4Þ
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holds, where c*ni denotes the legal cost when the initial return is að1þ eÞ. This
condition is parallel to equation (3) in the case of relational contracts; it says
that when the new trade opportunities (indicated by ae) are large enough to
compensate for the cost c*ni of writing a new legal contract and the loss of return
on learning (agi) in the old match, it is optimal to break up the current match
and form a new one. These are formally proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 When outside opportunities are high ðe  eiÞ, the short-term
legal contract is a SPE for an agent of type i, where the threshold level
ei[giþc*ni

a is derived from equation (4). Legal contracts enable agents
to take advantage of new opportunities more often than relational con-
tracts but they are less likely to be used by the elite (because
em < ee < b=dqa).
This lemma suggests that it is optimal for agents to engage in short-term
legal contracts once the outside opportunities are large enough compared with
the legal cost and the forgone beneﬁt of learning in an established match.
Given that the threshold level of new opportunity is higher (ee > em) for
the elite, they are less willing to adopt short-term legal contracts than others,
where the underlying reason is again due to their higher returns in established
partnerships ðge > gmÞ. Comparing the two types of contracts, the condition
em < ee < b=dqa suggests that legal contracts enable agents to break up old
matches more often than relational contracts (with threshold b=dqa derived
above) in order to take advantage of new opportunities.
3.3 Comparison between Relational and Legal Contracts
Recall that, for an agent of type i 2 fe;mg, the net value of using a long-term
relational contract is Vyi  R*i and that of using a short-term legal contract is
Vˆyi  c*i . So the beneﬁt of switching from relational to legal contracts is the
difference between these two net values: p

q; e; gi

[

Vˆyi  c*i
 Vyi  R*i ,
which after some algebra becomes
pðq; e; giÞ ¼ ð1 qÞðae b=dqÞ
þ dð1 qÞ
1 d ðae agi  c
*
niÞ þ
aþ b
dq
Qðc*i ; qÞ:
Its properties and implications are summarized below.
Lemma 4 The relative beneﬁt of using legal contracts is larger and thus
relational contracts are used less when outside opportunities e are larger,
when the legal quality q is higher, and when the return on learning gi is
lower. For any given e and q, since the elite enjoy higher gains from
established matches than others ðge> gmÞ, they beneﬁt less from switch-
ing to legal contracts.
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The intuition is as follows. Better outside opportunities make it more worth-
while to break up the old match since a new partnership promises higher gains
from trade. The beneﬁt is also larger when the legal quality q is higher because
the legal cost of forming new matches decreases in q. Since the elite have
comparative advantages in using long-term relational contracts due to
ge > gm, they are less willing to adopt legal contracts than the nonelite.
This is the main insight that is underlying the different incentives for legal
investment.
4. Investment in Legal Quality
This section analyzes the ﬁrst phase of the model where the legal quality q is
endogenized in a political economy context. Speciﬁcally, the politically dom-
inant interest group chooses the level of legal quality to maximize its joint
welfare while taking into consideration the effect of legal quality on its
expected returns in the subsequent repeated matching game.29 Without any
investment, the initial legal quality is zero and thus all agents use relational
contracts. So the legal investment, if ever made, has to be large enough to make
agents willing to shift from relational to legal contracts.
4.1 Socially Optimal Legal Investment
The socially optimal level of legal investment is determined to maximize the
aggregate welfare of all agents. The total beneﬁt of increasing the legal quality
from 0 to q is rpðq; e; geÞ þ ð1 rÞpðq; e; gmÞ if all agents shift from long-term
relational contracts to short-term legal contracts, which is the focus of the
following analysis.30 The total investment cost CðqÞ is equally shared among
all agents. So the optimal legal quality qs is deﬁned by
qs[ arg maxq

rpðq; e; geÞ þ

1 rpðq; e; gmÞ  Cq; 0:
Since the beneﬁts of using legal contracts are strictly increasing in the outside
opportunities e, there must exist a unique level es such that
rpðqs; es; geÞ þ ð1 rÞpðqs; es; gmÞ  CðqsÞ ¼ 0: ð5Þ
So es is the socially optimal threshold level of e, above which legal investment
starts.
Proposition 1 When outside opportunities are low ðe%esÞ, it is socially
optimal to have no legal investment. Legal development starts only when
29. Here the legal quality refers to the actual quality of legal enforcement, not to the quality of
the rule book, which can be amended without much cost.
30. It is also possible that the legal quality is only high enough for the nonelite agents to switch
to legal contracts while the elite still use relational contracts, in which case the total beneﬁt of legal
investment is ð1 rÞpðq; e; gmÞ. As the main results are similar, this case is omitted to simplify the
exposition.
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outside opportunities are high enough ðe > esÞ, where es increases while
qs decreases with return on learning gi.
This proposition suggests that the threshold level of outside opportunities,
es, for a society to start legal investment is higher and the optimal legal quality
qs is lower when the productivity of established matches represented by gi is
higher. If e is drawn from some exogenous distribution Fð  Þ, the probability of
investing in legal quality is 1 FðesÞ, which is lower if gi is higher. So in the
socially optimal case, a society is less likely to invest in legal quality and
invests less (if ever invested) when long-term relational contracts are more
effective in achieving cooperation.
4.2 Legal Investment with Exogenous Political Systems
As the beneﬁts from legal investment differ across agents, which has become
clear in the preceding analysis, political conﬂicts may play an important role in
the determination of legal quality. Suppose the political system is determined
exogenously, where a society is either under elite rule or under majority rule,
and legal quality is chosen to maximize the welfare of the politically dominant
group.
Legal Investment under Elite Rule. Under elite rule, the elite group is dom-
inant and hence will choose a legal investment level to maximize its own
welfare. The total beneﬁt for the elite group from increasing legal quality from
0 to q is rpðq; e; geÞ while the cost it has to pay is rCðqÞ, since the total cost
CðqÞ is shared among all agents where the elite group is of r proportion.31 So
the optimal legal quality q*e under elite rule is
q*e [ arg maxq

rpðq; e; geÞ  rC

q

; 0

:
Since pðq; e; geÞ is strictly increasing in e, there must exist a unique level ee
such that
pðq*e ; ee; geÞ  C

q*e
 ¼ 0: ð6Þ
So the elite ruling society starts legal investment only when e > ee, in which
case the legal quality q*e is uniquely determined by
p1

q*e ; e; ge
 C#q*e ¼ 0: ð7Þ
31. The legal investment cost CðqÞ can be paid by tax revenues generated from the population.
Here, it is assumed that each agent pays the same amount of tax. Alternative cost-sharing methods
should not change the main results. For example, in the extreme case where the elite agents are
required to pay nothing for legal investment, they will not start it unless pðq; e; geÞ  0, but the
socially optimal legal development may start even when pðq; e; geÞ < 0 is true. And more impor-
tantly, there is always an opportunity cost of improving legal quality, since the tax revenues can be
used in other ways to increase the elites utility. In this sense, legal investment is always costly from
the elites perspective.
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Proposition 2 Under elite rule, the threshold outside opportunity ee to
start legal investment is higher and the legal quality q*e is lower than
in the socially optimal case, and the more so when return on learning
ge is higher.
This proposition suggests that the elite are less likely to invest in legal qual-
ity and invest less (if ever invested) when they are relatively more productive
in established partnerships. And compared with the socially optimal case, legal
quality is lower and the threshold productivity shock needed to start legal
investment is higher under elite rule. So legal development is slower under
elite rule than in the socially optimal case, and thus agents are more likely
to use relational contracts and less likely to use legal contracts.
Legal Investment under Majority Rule. Under majority rule, the masses are
politically dominant and thus choose a level of legal quality to maximize their
overall welfare ð1 rÞpðq; e; gmÞ  ð1 rÞCðqÞ. The same results will go
through if the median voter of the population chooses the optimal legal invest-
ment to maximize his own welfare, since all nonelite agents are identical and
they constitute the majority. So legal quality under democracy with majority
voting will be the same. The analysis is similar to that under elite rule. The
optimal legal quality q*m under majority rule is uniquely determined by
p1

q*m; e; gm
 C#q*m ¼ 0 ð8Þ
when e > em, and is zero otherwise, where the threshold outside opportunity
em satisﬁes
pðq*m; em; gmÞ  C

q*m
 ¼ 0: ð9Þ
Proposition 3 Under majority rule, the threshold outside opportunity em
to start legal investment is lower and the legal quality q*m is higher than in
the socially optimal case, and the more so when return on learning gm is
lower.
This proposition suggests that, compared with the socially optimal case,
legal quality under majority rule is larger and the threshold productivity shock
needed to start legal investment is lower. In other words, a society under
majority rule may overinvest in legal quality to a level higher than what is
socially optimal. This is not surprising, since the masses, who are more dis-
advantaged under long-term relational contracts than the elite, can enjoy more
beneﬁts from utilizing new trade opportunities with legal contracts and hence
have more incentives to improve the legal system.
Comparison between Political Regimes. Depending on the level of e, legal
development may differ across political regimes. There are three possible
scenarios, which are illustrated in Figure 1 and analyzed below.
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Case 1: Small Outside Opportunities (e%em). There is no legal invest-
ment in any political system so that q*m ¼ 0 ¼ q*e and only long-term
relational contracts are used. The income inequality, as represented
by the income gap G1 between the two types of agents, is the largest,
where
G1[Vye  R*e 

Vym  R*m
 ¼ age  gm1 d
is derived from results in the last section.
Case 2: Medium Outside Opportunities (em%e%ee). There is still no
legal investment under elite rule, but the society under majority rule will
start to invest in the legal system so that q*m > 0 ¼ q*e . As a result, agents
under majority rule adopt legal contracts and thus can take advantage of
the new trade opportunities that are more productive, which decreases
income inequality to32
G2

q*m; e

[ Vˆye  c*e 

Vˆym  c*m
 ¼ G1  pðq*m; e; gmÞ  pðq*m; e; geÞ;
which is smaller than that in Case 1 and in society under elite rule.
Case 3: Large Outside Opportunities (e > ee). There is positive legal
investment under both political systems, though legal quality is higher
under majority rule than under elite rule: q*m > q
*
e > 0. As legal contracts
allow agents to exploit new trade opportunities, the traditional advantage
of the elite in terms of ge > gm matters less in both societies than before,
and the income gap is always lower under majority rule because it can be
shown that G2

q*m; e

< G2

q*e ; e

holds.
Figure 1. Legal Investment under Different Political Regimes.
32. If the elite agents still use relational contracts, the income gap under majority rule is
G1  pðq*m; e; gmÞ.
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An important implication from these scenarios is that as the productivity of
new trade opportunities e becomes higher relative to that of established part-
nerships, it is more likely for legal development to start and for legal quality to
be higher. Another implication is that legal development often leads to lower
income inequality, but legal development is less likely to occur under elite rule
than under democracy. So elite rule, lower legal quality, and higher income
inequality form an organic cluster of political and legal institutions with cor-
responding economic outcomes, whereas their opposites, namely democracy,
higher legal quality, and lower income inequality, form another cluster.
It is also possible that, under the same political regime, different levels of
legal development are caused purely by an arbitrarily small difference in out-
side opportunities e. Imagine two identical societies under elite rule. One
society experiences a slightly larger shock e ¼ ee þ u and thus invests in legal
quality; the other society experiences a slightly smaller shock e ¼ ee  u and
thus does not invest. Even if everything else is identical across the two
societies, their economic outlooks are very different: the lucky society has
higher legal quality, its agents adopt legal contracts, and its income distribution
is more equal than the unlucky one. These results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 When outside opportunities e are larger, legal develop-
ment is more likely to start, and it leads to lower income inequality;
the process is slower and income inequality is higher under elite rule
than under majority rule.
4.3 Legal Investment with Endogenous Political Systems
When political dominance has to be backed up by economic strength, it can be
shown that the elite are even less willing to invest in legal quality because
their relative economic power is likely to be weakened as a result of legal
development.
Suppose the political system is determined by the balance of economic
power among different groups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a). In particular,
when the total wealth of the elite agents is higher than that of the masses,
the elite group is politically dominant and the society is under elite rule;
if the opposite is true, it is under majority rule. The political system is deter-
mined both before and after the legal investment decision, since the income
distribution may change with legal quality.
When the legal quality is zero, all agents use long-term relational contracts
and get corresponding returns Vye  R*e or Vym  R*m in addition to their
endowed wealth we or wm; so elite rule happens if
r

we þ Vye  R*e
  1 rwm þ Vym  R*m: ð10Þ
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Elite rule continues automatically if there is no legal reform, since the income
distribution remains the same. If the legal quality is increased to q > 0 and all
agents switch from relational to legal contracts, elite rule continues if
r

we þ Vˆye  c*e
  1 rwm þ Vˆym  c*m: ð11Þ
It is easy to show that whenever equation (11) holds, equation (10) will also
hold, but the reverse is not true. This means that legal investment weakens the
economic power of the elite. To see this more clearly, let Y ðqÞ denote the
relative economic power of the elite compared with the masses, where
Y

q

[ r

we þ Vˆye  c*e
 1 rwm þ Vˆym  c*m:
Then 11 is equivalent to Y ðqÞ  0; that is, elite rule occurs when Y ðqÞ  0
while democracy arises otherwise. And thus Y ðqÞ indicates how secure elite
rule is.
Proposition 5 Legal development weakens elite rule but solidiﬁes
democracy, since Y #

q

< 0. Speciﬁcally, legal quality can never reach
above q under elite rule, where Y ðqÞ¼ 0:
This proposition suggests that elite rule survives only when q%q, and it is
more secure when q is lower; in contrast, democracy arises when q > q and
it is solidiﬁed when q is higher. This means that, when the political system
is endogenously determined, q is the highest possible legal quality that can sus-
tain elite rule. So even if the elite choose to start the legal development process, it
is slower than the socially optimal case and may not increase above a certain
threshold q.
The endogenization of political regimes further strengthens the relationship
between elite rule, lower legal quality, and higher income inequality by mak-
ing them mutually reinforcing; it is not only the case that elite rule leads to
slower legal development and hence higher income inequality but also true is
the opposite direction where higher income inequality leads to elite rule, which
completes the self-perpetuating circle. The other cluster of lower income
inequality, democracy, and higher legal quality also forms a self-perpetuating
circle with mutually reinforcing elements. One can imagine that, if e increases
over time, it is possible for the institutional circle of elite rule to persist for
a long period and then eventually make the transition to the democracy circle
of institutions, though the detail is best left for future research.
5. Extensions and Discussions
A key insight of this article is on the importance of trading with new partners:
only when the outside opportunities e become large enough compared with
returns in established partnerships, would a society feel it is desirable to invest
in legal contract enforcement in order to facilitate the frequent breaking up of
old matches and formation of new ones. Another insight is on the conﬂict of
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interests in legal development; speciﬁcally, the traditional rich elite, who enjoy
comparative advantages in relational contracts due to better endowment or
privileges, often beneﬁt less from a competent legal system than the masses
and hence have less incentive to improve legal quality. These two insights are
much more robust than the highly simpliﬁed model seems to suggest. To
illustrate this, this section introduces some extensions of the basic model
and discusses possible interpretations of the results.
5.1 Contract Enforcement with Social Communities
In the basic model, agents do not have stable connections among each other
except for the bilateral contracts between them, which is not true in reality where
individuals belong to different communities. This assumption can be relaxed and
our main results still go through and are even strengthened. Since social com-
munities tend to be stronger or function better in a collective-oriented culture
than in individualistic ones (Greif 1994), the following arguments and results
about the effects of social communities also apply to a collective culture.
To illustrate the main idea, suppose there are Ne social communities within
the elite group and Nm communities among the masses, where Ni > 1 is a ﬁnite
integer for i 2 fe;mg. A social community could be a family, a kinship net-
work, a clan, an ethnic group, a village or town, or a social club. Members in
the same community have formed intricate social connections or developed
valuable public goods before the game in the basic model starts. As a result,
if a member cheats in the PD as described in Table 1, his partner or the com-
munity can impose upon the defector some punishment xi > 0 at a negligible
cost, where i 2 fe;mg. The punishment can take many forms. For example, in
a well-organized social club where members enjoy certain privileges, anybody
ever found cheating can be formally expelled from the club or informally
shunned by other members (Bernstein 1992); neighbors in a small village
or members of a close-knit group typically interact with each other in many
different ways or even across generations, which provides ample opportunities
to punish someone who has cheated (Ellickson 1991).
This means that dealing with a partner from the same community is less risky
or less costly than dealing with somebody from outside. It is essentially equiv-
alent to reducing the temptation of cheating in the PD game from b to b xi for
agents in the same community. Another interpretation is that community mem-
bers have formed multilateral relationships with each other that are worth xi and
can be carried on across partnerships. This makes it less costly for agents to
break up bilateral relational contracts in order to capture higher gains from trade
arising in new partnerships. So in some sense, a part of the beneﬁt of a long-run
relationship switches from the bilateral partnership to the community level,
where agents can change partners when new matches become more productive
but still remain in the multilateral environment of the same community. In other
words, the long-term relationship building is now within the borders of a com-
munity instead of the much narrower bilateral relations between two individuals.
As a consequence, trade efﬁciency will be enhanced.
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There is, however, a potential drawback for contract enforcement in com-
munities because it makes agents reluctant to trade with outsiders, which
becomes more relevant when new partnerships are more productive between
agents from different communities than those within the same community.
A competent legal system is thus needed to facilitate trading among agents
across communities.
Suppose in every period the gain from trade is awith probability q in all new
partnerships, whereas with probability 1 q the gain from trade is að1þ eÞ as
before for new partnerships within the same community but increases to
að1þ eþ hÞ for those across different communities, where h > 0 indicates
the extra gain in productivity from matching with strangers. Similar arguments
as in the basic model can be used to show that only when h is large enough will
legal investment start. Furthermore, if xe  xm so that the elite agents are better
at enforcing multilateral relationships in communities, they will be even less
willing to invest in legal quality than in the basic model. The relevant results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The existence of social communities improves trading ef-
ﬁciency over bilateral relational contracts by reducing relationship-
building costs and by encouraging new partnership formation within
communities. However, it reduces the incentives of a society to invest
in legal quality, the more so when communities are more effective in
enforcing relational contracts (xi larger), regardless of political regimes.
This proposition suggests that, when social communities are more effective
in contract enforcement (when xe or xm is higher), a larger productivity gap
between matches within the community and those with outsiders is needed
for a society to start legal investment, and the gap is also larger than that
in the basic model. So legal development is likely to be slower when social
communities are functioning better in facilitating relational contracts regard-
less of political regimes, which also applies to the socially optimal result. That is,
the existence of stronger communities or collective cultures itself does not nec-
essarily lead to inefﬁciency, though it does cause slower legal development.
These results seem to be useful in understanding differences between East
Asia and the West, where social communities are arguably more prevalent in
East Asian countries than in the West; and probably as a result of this differ-
ence, legal contract enforcement is used less intensively in East Asia than in
the West.33 This, however, does not necessarily mean that legal development
in East Asia is less efﬁcient, which seems to be supported by recent strong
33. It is ‘‘commonly acknowledged that East Asian organizations or ﬁrms tend to place less
emphasis on the use of written, or formal, legal contracts than their western counterparts’’ (Choi
1994). In Southeast Asia, ethnic Chinese originated from the same region in China usually conduct
business transactions in informal clubs (Landa 1981). Generally, networks of interpersonal rela-
tionships, based on the traditional kinship emphasis, have played a signiﬁcant role in East Asias
economic development. Such cultural stress on the collectivity rather than the individual, and the
communitarian values and practices are well observed and acknowledged (Huntington 1996).
20 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity on A
pril 9, 2012
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
economic growth of East Asian countries. In other words, as long as income
inequality is not high and political power is not centralized to the elite,
a heavier reliance on relational contracts due to competent social communities
or cultural preferences does not have to block economic development.
5.2 Open Versus Closed Society
In the model, the importance of outside opportunities e is taken as exogenously
given. This, however, can be readily endogenized to generate new insights. For
example, one can imagine that in a closed society that has little contact with the
outside world, the outside opportunities e tend to be rare and of small scale.
According to the arguments in the model, legal investment is less likely to start
(due to e < ei), and so elite rule is easier to maintain. The opposite is true in an
open society, where legal development is likely to start early and eventually
weaken elite rule.
Foreseeing such consequences, a society under elite rule would be less willing
to adopt an open policy than those under democracy if the degree of openness can
be affected by policies, and as a result, it is less likely to experience large outside
opportunities and to feel the necessity to improve its legal system. If the political
rent is large, which tends to happen when land and other natural resources are
abundant, the elite are more likely to adopt a closed-society policy in order to
preserve elite rule, and as a consequence, legal development is further retarded.
5.3 Relevant Examples
In an effort to understand the development of legal contract enforcement and
why it differs across societies, this article uses a theoretical model where legal
quality of contract enforcement is a costly public good. This modeling assump-
tion leads to two main results. First, a society would start to invest in legal
enforcement only when the beneﬁts of doing so become high enough relative
to the default choice of using relational contracts, which happens, for example,
when trading with new partners yields higher returns than staying with old
ones. Second, when the beneﬁts of improving legal quality of contract enforce-
ment differ across individuals, the actual investment is likely to be affected by
political economy forces; in particular, if the traditional elite have comparative
advantages over the masses in utilizing relational contracts, legal development
may be delayed when the elite hold dominant political power compared with
the socially optimal level, whereas the same logic suggests that overinvestment
may occur when the masses are in power.
To see whether the insights developed here are useful, it would be desirable
to systematically examine the comparative history of contract law development,
but such a task is clearly beyond the scope of this article. What this section does
is thus very modest; it attempts to convince the reader that the main results in
this article are relevant in accounting for some stylized historical facts.
From early medieval times, trade and commerce started to gather momen-
tum in Europe. For several hundred years since then, merchants had to rely on
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social relations and networks (relational contracts) to handle contract issues
with each other (Benson 1989). Legal development in contract enforcement
was not put on the political agenda until much later in history. For much
of the history of the common law in England, for example, contract law
remained poorly developed until the law merchant (a medieval series of
customs and principles used to regulate trading) was incorporated into the
common law under the leadership of Mansﬁeld in the 18th century.34
The development of commercial law in England seems to be lagging behind
the commercial need; a possible reason proposed in this article is the lack of
interest by the ruling monarch and the landed elite class. This becomes evident
when one notices that land law was well developed early on and dominated
English law, especially in the common law courts. Such a stark contrast is not
surprising because, compared with relationships concerning land, other kinds
of legal relationships, including commercial contracts and tort, were of little
consequence for the landed elite (Zywicki 2003).35 Only after commercial and
industrial activities became important enough in the economy, were their inter-
ests reﬂected by the political regime change (the Glorious Revolution in 1688
established the political dominance of parliament), which preceded the legal
reform in the 18th century that developed the commercial law (Atiyah 1979).36
34. It is useful to note that the law merchant, though having its own courts with judges or
arbitrators, eventually relies on a merchants concern of his own reputation and the social network
to enforce cooperation. So in essence it is a function of social community (similar to a villages
committee of senior people in settling disputes among villagers), and thus still belongs to the realm
of relational contracts. If one agrees that legal contract enforcement is characterized by the ultimate
reliance on a states coercive power for enforcement, then it is natural to see that the law merchant
should not be regarded as a form of legal enforcement. Furthermore, the fact that the role of the law
merchant greatly diminished in England after it was absorbed into the common law seems to in-
dicate the advantage of legal enforcement relative to the law merchant.
35. To connect with the political economy analysis of the model, note that the elite and the
masses are both concerned with contractual exchange (Atiyah 1979), where one difference is that
the elite (land owners) are concernedmore with land transactions while themasses (if without land)
with other types of business exchange (e.g., trading goods or services). So when the landed elite are
in power, legal enforcement regarding land transfer is developed earlier than in the socially optimal
case, whereas legal development in commercial contract enforcement where landed elite have less
to gain is delayed; note that in the socially optimal case the land law could have been established
later than the general contract law given that land owners have comparative advantages over others
in using relational contracts. This is consistent with the general result of the political economy
model in the article, which predicts that legal development is often suited to the interests of
the politically dominant group; there is, indeed, a minor difference, where in the model the legal
quality is assumed to be homogeneous in all contractual activities, whereas in the England case the
legal quality of land transactions was different from that of commercial trades. One should bear in
mind, however, that this description of English legal development may not tell us the entire story;
for example, there are many other differences between the elite and the masses besides their dis-
tinct returns from legal enforcement, and as such the body of law related to land that provided
peace and security also addressed issues of property rights and some of what now appears in tort
law rather than the body of law about commercial affairs per se.
36. As another example, France became the ﬁrst modern Continental nation at the end of the
15th century, but there was no uniﬁed national body of law (the French civil code of 1804) until
after the French Revolution.
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The inﬂuence of Atlantic trade on institutional change across Europe
(Acemoglu et al. 2005) is also consistent with the main results in this article.
The opening of the sea routes to the NewWorld, Africa, and Asia and colonial
expansion can be regarded as an exogenous increase in outside trading oppor-
tunities e in the model. It enriched merchants and traders outside the royal
circle and landed elite in England and the Netherlands, and hence altered
the balance of political power and prompted corresponding institutional
changes that favor commercial interests. However, in countries with absolutist
political regimes such as Spain, Portugal, and to some extent France, similar
reforms did not happen partially because Atlantic trade was restricted to the
royal circle and thus the commercial class did not gain much power during the
process. These observations suggest that the presence of large outside oppor-
tunities, by altering the political balance of power, is often the ultimate driving
force behind legal and other institutional changes; this, however, is less likely
to happen in societies where the elite are more dominant.
This article’s results may also be useful in understanding differences in legal
development between Latin America, East Asia, and the advanced Western
countries. The article shows that relational contracts are more widespread
when the legal system is of low quality, which is in turn linked to high-income
inequality, elite rule, and strong social networks. All of these elements
are present in Latin America, whereas the opposites are often observed in
the developed West, especially North America, and somewhat in between
are East Asian countries under the inﬂuence of Confucian culture.37
The sharp contrast between Latin and North America may be deeply
rooted in their colonial institutions, which in turn can be linked to different
levels of inequality in endowment (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). Indeed,
large plantation agriculture and slavery in mining in Latin America induced
huge disparities in wealth and thus made it more prone to elite rule and slow
legal development. ‘‘In contrast, small, family-sized farms were the rule in
the northern colonies of the North American mainland, where . . . the
circumstances fostered relatively homogeneous populations with relatively
37. The empirical evidence (Botero et al. 2004) seems to be consistent with the main results of
the model. Legal quality (as negatively indicated by ‘‘log number of days to start a business’’) is
lowest in Latin America and highest in the West (including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, US,
UK, Canada, Australia, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand), whereas East Asia (including Japan, Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan) is in the middle. The usage of informal contracts as indicated by
‘‘size of the unofﬁcial economy’’ as a percentage of GDP is highest in Latin America and lowest in
the West, whereas again East Asia falls in the middle. The per capita GNP and the average school-
ing level during 1995–2000, which may reﬂect the extent of economic development, are the lowest
in the Latin America, while those of others are much higher and similar to each other. The average
Gini index is around 32–36 for both the West and East Asia, while it is 51.4 in Latin America,
which has almost the highest income inequality among all countries (United Nations 2005).
Contract Enforcement 23
 at Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity on A
pril 9, 2012
http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
equal distributions of human capital and wealth’’ (Engerman and Sokoloff
2002).38 In both Latin American and East Asian countries, relational
contracts are more extensively used, and social communities and collective
culture are stronger relative to North America;39 a crucial difference
between them, however, is that income inequality is much higher in Latin
America and elite rule is stronger, which may lead to its lower economic
growth and legal quality relative to East Asia. Finally, differences in
contract enforcement between East Asia and the West are probably due
to cultural differences, and both styles may be justiﬁable in terms of social
welfare optimization. In summary, strong social communities or a collective
culture (in East Asia) may slow down legal development (compared with the
West) but not necessarily reduce overall welfare; elite rule, however, may
cause both (in Latin America), and hence seems to be more detrimental to
development.
6. Conclusions
Contract enforcement institutions are important for economic performance
because most economic exchanges are subject to risk of default and the
potential gains from trade may not be realized. This article analyzes the differ-
ences between legal contracts and relational contracts at both individual and
communal levels and ﬁnds that a fundamental conﬂict of interest in legal
investment lies in the different returns of using relational and legal contracts
across agents, where the traditional rich elite gain relatively less from legal
enforcement than the masses. In other words, it is the less well-endowed
masses that stand to gain relatively more from investing in a competent legal
system. And so it is not surprising that, if the rich elite are politically dominant
and choose legal investment to maximize their own welfare, legal develop-
ment tends to be slower than in the socially optimal case, whereas overinvest-
ment in legal quality and underusage of relational contracts may happen under
majority rule.
Furthermore, it turns out that elite rule, slow legal development, and high-
income inequality may form a self-perpetuating circle: Elite rule leads to slow
legal development, whereas lower legal quality helps preserve high-income
38. The main contrast between North America and Latin America holds despite some excep-
tions. Large plantations, for example, existed in the South, but the size of the slave plantations, the
share of the population composed of slaves, and the degree of inequality in these colonies were
quite modest by the standards of Brazil or the sugar islands. As an exception in Latin America,
Argentina was a grain producer, yet by the second half of the 19th century, substantial inequality in
the distributions of land, human capital, and political inﬂuence was clearly apparent.
39. Generally, contract law involving the sale of goods has become highly standardized in the
US as a result of the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (except in
Louisiana), though there is still signiﬁcant diversity in the interpretation of other kinds of contracts,
depending upon the extent to which a given state has codiﬁed its common law of contracts or
adopted portions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Barnett 2010). These differences
are more in the technical details rather than in the quality of legal enforcement.
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inequality, which in turn tends to give rise to elite rule; this suggests that these
economic, political, and legal conditions belong to an organic cluster of insti-
tutions that generate and support each other in a mutually reinforcing way. It is
straightforward to see that the opposite cluster of low-income inequality,
democracy, and high legal quality is also self-perpetuating. The transition
between these two clusters is an intriguing topic that is worth pursuing in future
research.
This article also ﬁnds that better functioning social communities help
improve trade efﬁciency in relational contracts and thus may also slow down
legal development. This by itself, however, is not necessarily welfare reduc-
ing, since legal enforcement is only one alternative among many and its low
usage can be the socially optimal result of having better alternatives.
Following the same logic as above, only when agents who belong to commu-
nities with more effective contract enforcement dictate legal investment deci-
sions, would the resulting lower legal quality be suboptimal. The enforcement
quality of social communities is taken as exogenous in this article, presumably
as a side-effect of other purposes served by communities. It might be useful in
future research to study the formation and function of communities in order to
understand how their contract enforcement capabilities, in a broad sense, are
endogenously generated.
Appendix
Proof of Ri  b=dagiþð1 qÞae.
Proof. The no-deviation case in an established match is similar. Suppose in the
nth period the partnership is still not broken, where n  2. If an agent coop-
erates in the PD game, he gets a payoff að1þ giÞ=ð1 dÞ; if he defects, his
payoff is að1þ giÞ þ bþ dEVi. So he will not defect if að1þ giÞ=
ð1 dÞ  að1þ giÞ þ bþ dEVi, which leads to the same condition (1) as
in a new match. The reason is that the beneﬁt of cheating remains the same
in both cases.
The possible one-shot deviations when the initial gain from trade is að1þ eÞ
can also be analyzed similarly, where deviation is not proﬁtable when (1) is
satisﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. The proof focuses only on elite agents, since the mechanism is identical
for others. The value of a new match with return a is denoted by Vˆye on the equi-
librium path, whereas the value of an established match with return að1þ geÞ is
denoted by Vˆze. The value of starting a new match with the gain from trade
að1þ eÞ is denoted by Vˆne while cne is the legal cost. When players cooperate
in a new match, they get a immediately, followed by a continuation value
E V e ¼ qVˆze þ ð1 qÞðVˆne  cneÞ;
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where with probability q agents stay in the same match and get a value Vˆze,
while with probability 1 q the old match dissolves as a result of the positive
productivity shock e and thus agents form a new match with others to get
Vˆne  cne. That is,
Vˆye ¼ aþ dE V e; ð12Þ
and Vˆne ¼ að1þ eÞ þ dE V e. It is easy to see that
Vˆne ¼ Vˆye þ ae: ð13Þ
The continuation value Vˆze is determined in a similar way; the only difference
is that the current return is að1þ geÞ due to learning-by-doing in the same
match: Vˆze ¼ að1þ geÞ þ dE V e: So it is obvious that
Vˆze ¼ Vˆye þ age: ð14Þ
From equations (12)–(14), we get
Vˆye ¼ aþ dqage þ dð1 qÞðae cneÞ
1 d : ð15Þ
Lets check the possible one-shot deviation when the initial gain from trade is
a. In a new match, if an agent cooperates, the match will continue where he
gets Vˆye  ce. If he cheats, he gets a payoff of ðaþ bÞð1 Qðce; qÞÞþ
dEVˆe  ce, where the ﬁrst term is his expected current payoff, and EVˆe is
the continuation value in the next period when he becomes an unmatched
player since his partner will break up the partnership according to the contract.
The expected value of entering a new match is
EVˆe ¼ qðVˆye  ceÞ þ

1 qVˆne  cne;
since the net value of starting a new match when the gain from trade is a is
Vˆye  ce, which occurs with probability q, while with probability 1 q the
new match is more productive and yields a net value Vˆne  cne. Cheating is
thus not optimal when

aþ b1 Qce; q%Vˆye  dEVˆe holds, which is
simpliﬁed to
ðaþ bÞQðce; qÞ þ dqce  b dqage: ð16Þ
In the nth period when the partnership is still not broken, where n  2, the one-
shot deviation is less proﬁtable than in the ﬁrst period. If an agent cooperates in
the PD game, he gets a payoff Vˆze; if he defects, his payoff is ½að1þ geÞ þ b
ð1 Qðce; qÞÞ þ dEVˆe. So he will not defect if
ðað1þ geÞ þ bÞQðce; qÞ þ dqce  b dqage;
which is satisﬁed when equation (16) holds.
Deﬁne c*e to make the equality in equation (16) hold and we get
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c*e ¼ b

dq age 

aþ bQc*e ; qdq; ð17Þ
which is the minimum cost of using the legal contract when the legal quality is
q and the initial gain from trade is a. Based on equation (17), we get
@c*e
@q ¼  ðaþbÞQ2ðaþbÞQ1þdq < 0;
@c*e
@ge
¼  dqaðaþbÞQ1þdq < 0;
and @c*e

@e ¼ 0:
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. The main task of the proof is to calculate the optimal legal cost c*ni,
which is uniquely determined by

a

1þ gi
þ bQc*ni; qþ dqc*i ¼ b dqagi:
We focus on solving cne for elite agents, since the mechanism is identical for
nonelite agents.
Lets check the possible one-shot deviation when the initial gain from trade
is að1þ eÞ. In a newmatch, if an agent cooperates, the match will continue and
so he gets Vˆne  cne. If he cheats, he gets a payoff of ðað1þ eÞ þ bÞ
ð1 Qðcne; qÞÞ þ dEVˆe  cne. Similar exercises as in the text show that cheat-
ing is not optimal when cne  cLe, where cLe is uniquely determined by
a

1þ eþ bQcLe; qþ dqc*e ¼ b dqage; or equivalently
Q

cLe; q
	
¼ aþ b
að1þ eÞ þ bQ

c*e ; q
	
: ð18Þ
So cLe is the minimum cost of using the legal contract to deter cheating in a new
match when the initial gain from trade is að1þ eÞ.
Similar arguments suggest that cheating is not proﬁtable in any nth period of
a match where the initial gain of trade is að1þ eÞ if

a

1þ ge
þ bQcne; qþ dqc*e  b dqage ð19Þ
holds. So the minimum legal cost that deters cheating in an established match
is c*ne which is determined by
a

1þ ge
þ bQc*ne; qþ dqc*e ¼ b dqage ð20Þ
or equivalently
Q

c*ne; q
	
¼ aþ b
að1þ geÞ þ bQ

c*e ; q
	
:
It is easy to check that c*ne < c
*
e is true, and c
*
ne > cLe holds if e > ge. So when
the initial gain of trade is að1þ eÞ, the legal cost should be at least as large as
c*ne to deter cheating when e > ge. Now we show c
*
ne also decreases in q. Let
a new value cˆ satisfy ðað1þ geÞ þ bÞQðcˆ; qÞ þ dqc ¼ b dqage where c is
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a constant such that c > c*e . Comparing it with equation (20) that determines
c*ne, we get c
*
ne > cˆ. So c
*
ne is in between c
*
e and cˆ, and c
*
ne becomes identical to
c*e when ge ¼ 0 and arbitrarily close to cˆ when c is approaching c*e . Since both
c*e and cˆ are decreasing in q, so is c
*
ne.
The net value of starting a new match is Vˆne  cne when the initial return is
að1þ eÞ, while the value of continuing with the old match for another period is
Vˆze. So it is optimal for agents to dissolve the old match when Vˆne  cne  Vˆze
holds, which leads to c*ne%a

e ge

, and thus ee ¼ ge þ c*ne

a.
Next, we prove ee < b=dqa. This is indeed so because equations (17) and
(20) imply that dqc*ne < dqc
*
e and dqc
*
e%b dqage, which together implies
that dqc*ne < b dqage and hence ee[ge þ c*ne

a < b

dqa.
And ﬁnally we show that ee > em holds because ge > gm and
@ee
@ge
¼ 1þ 1
a
@c*ne
@ge
> 0: ð21Þ
Note that
@c*ne
@ge
¼ aþb
að1þgeÞþbQ1ðc*e ; qÞ
@c*e
@ge
 aðaþbÞðað1þgeÞþbÞ2Qðc
*
e ; qÞ
¼  1½að1þgeÞþb½
dqaðaþbÞQ1
ðaþbÞQ1þd*q 
aðaþbÞQ
ðað1þgeÞþbÞ2 < 0;
where
@c*e
@ge
is derived earlier based on equation (17). Lets check whether
1
a
@c*ne
@ge
> 1 or equivalently j@c*ne@ge
.
aj < 1 holds; this is indeed true because



@c*ne@ge
.
a



 < 1að1þgeÞþb þ aþbðað1þgeÞþbÞ2
¼ að1þgeÞþbþaþbðað1þgeÞþbÞ2 < 1;
where the ﬁrst inequality holds due to
ðaþbÞQ1
ðaþbÞQ1þdqdq < 1 and Q%1.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. Comparing the legal cost c*e and the relationship building cost R
*
e , we
get
R*e  c*e ¼

1 qae bdqþ aþ bQc*e ; qdq:
Comparing the values of these two types of contracts, we get
Vˆye  Vye ¼
d

1 qae age  c*neÞ
1 d :
Plugging these two terms in pðq; e; geÞ, we have
p

q; e; geÞ[ Vˆye  c*e 

Vye  R*e
 ¼ Vˆye  Vye þ R*e  c*e
¼ ð1 dÞ1
h
1 q

ae

1 dq

age
d

1 q

c*ne
i
 c*e þ

1 q

bd1:
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It is straightforward to see that @pðq; e; geÞ
.
@e ¼ ð1 dÞ1ð1 qÞa > 0
holds as both c*e and c
*
ne are independent of e. And
@pðq;e;geÞ
@q ¼ @@q
h
dð1qÞðaeagec*neÞ
1d þ R*e  c*e
i
¼ dð1qÞ
1d
@c*ne
@q  @c
*
e
@q > 0
holds since both c*e and c
*
ne are decreasing in q while R
*
e is independent of q.
Finally,
@pðq; e; geÞ
@ge
¼ @

Vˆye  Vye

@ge
þ @

R*e  c*e

@ge
< 0
is true because @ðR*e  c*eÞ
.
@ge ¼ ðaþ bÞQ1ðc*e ; qÞðdqÞ1@c
*
e
@ge
< 0 and
@

Vˆye  Vye

@ge
¼ dð1 qÞa
1 d

1þ 1
a
@c*ne
@ge
	
< 0
due to equation (21).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for interior solutions is
ð1 rÞp1ðqs; e; gmÞ þ rp1ðqs; e; geÞ  C#ðqsÞ ¼ 0; ð22Þ
where
p1ðq; e; geÞ ¼ dð1 qÞ
1 d
@c*ne
@q
 @c
*
e
@q
> 0 ð23Þ
and p1ðq; e; gmÞ is similar. The second order condition
SOC[ r
@2p

q; e; geÞ
@q2
þ ð1 rÞ@
2p

q; e; gmÞ
@q2
 C##ðqÞ < 0
is satisﬁed because it can be shown that
@2p

q; e; giÞ
@q2
¼ dð1 qÞ
1 d
@2c˜Li
@q2
 @
2cˆLi
@q2
< 0:
So qs is uniquely determined by equation (22). Based on it, we get @qs=@e ¼ 0
and
@qs
@ge
¼

r
@2p

q; e; geÞ
@q@ge
þ ð1 rÞ@
2p

q; e; gmÞ
@q@gm

ð  SOCÞ1 < 0;
where it can be shown that
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@2p

q; e; geÞ
@q@ge
¼ dð1 qÞ
1 d
@2c*ne
@q@ge
 @
2c*e
@q@ge
< 0: ð24Þ
Then from equation (5) we get
@es
@ge
¼  rp3ðq
s; es; geÞ
rp2ðqs; es; geÞ þ ð1 rÞp2ðqs; es; gmÞ > 0;
where p3 < 0 and p2 > 0 are proved in Lemma 4. And Similarly @es=@gm > 0
holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The FOC for interior solutions is
p1ðq*e ; e; geÞ  C#ðq*eÞ ¼ 
dð1 qÞ
1 d
@c*ne
@q
 @c
*
e
@q
 C#ðq*eÞ ¼ 0:
The second order condition @2p

q; e; geÞ@q2  C##

q

< 0 is also satisﬁed so
that q*e is uniquely determined by equation (7). Based on it we get @q
*
e

@e ¼ 0
and
@q*e
@ge
¼ @
2pðq; e; geÞ
@q@ge

@
2p

q; e; geÞ
@q2
 C##ðqÞ
	
< 0:
Then from equation (6) we get
@ee
@ge
¼ p3

q*e ; e
e; ge

p2

q*e ; e
e; ge
 > 0;
where p3 < 0 and p2 > 0 are proved in Lemma 4. Since p3 < 0 and ge > gm,
we know p1

q*e ; e; gm

> p1

q*e ; e; ge

, which implies that
rp1

q*e ; e; ge
þ 1 rp1q*e ; e; gm C#q > p1q*e ; e; ge C#q*e ¼ 0;
where the equality follows from equation (7). Compared with equation (22),
this means q*e < q
s; that is, the legal quality under elite rule is lower than the
socially optimal level. Suppose the opposite condition ee%es holds; then
0 ¼ rpðqs; es; geÞ þ ð1 rÞpðqs; es; gmÞ  CðqsÞ by ð5Þ
> rpðq*e ; es; geÞ þ

1 rpðq*e ; es; gmÞ  Cq*e since qsis themaximizer
 rpðq*e ; ee; geÞ þ

1 rpðq*e ; ee; gmÞ  Cq*e if es  ee and by p2 > 0
> pðq*e ; ee; geÞ  C

q*e

since ge > gm and by p3 < 0
¼ 0 by ð6Þ;
which is not possible. Thus, ee > es must be true.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The optimization part and comparative statics are similar to the
above proof and can be easily derived based on the proof of Proposition 1.
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So they are omitted. Since p3 < 0 and ge > gm, we know p1

q*m; e; ge

<
p1

q*m; e; gm

, which implies that
rp1

q*m; e; ge
þ 1 rp1q*m; e; gm C#q < p1q*m; e; gm C#q*m ¼ 0;
where the equality follows from equation (8). Compared with equation (22),
this means q*m > q
s; that is, the legal quality under majority rule is higher than
the socially optimal level. Suppose the opposite condition em  es holds; then
0 ¼ rpðq*m; em; gmÞ þ

1 rpðq*m; em; gmÞ  Cq*mby 9
> rpðqs; em; gmÞ þ

1 rpðqs; em; gmÞ  Cqs since q*m is themaximizer
> rpðqs; em; geÞ þ ð1 rÞpðqs; em; gmÞ  CðqsÞ since ge > gm and byp3 < 0
> rpðqs; es; geÞ þ ð1 rÞpðqs; es; gmÞ  CðqsÞ if em  es andby p2 > 0
¼ 0 by ð5Þ;
which is not possible. Thus, em < es must be true.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. Note that
Y

q

[ r

we þ Vˆye  c*e
 1 rwm þ Vˆym  c*m;
where
Vˆyi  c*i ¼
aþ dqagi þ d

1 qae c*niÞ
1 d  c
*
i for i 2

e;m

:
Then
@Y ðqÞ
@q ¼ r
@ðVˆyec*eÞ
@q 

1 r

@ðVˆymc*mÞ
@q
¼ r
h
dð1qÞ
1d
@c*ne
@q  @c
*
e
@q
i
þ

1 r
h
dð1qÞ
1d
@c*nm
@q þ @c
*
m
@q
i
¼ rp1ðq; e; geÞ  ð1 rÞp1ðq; e; gmÞ by ð23Þ
< r½p1ðq; e; geÞ  p1ðq; e; gmÞ since  ð1 rÞ< r andp1ðq; e; gmÞ >0
< 0 since ge > gm and p13ðq; e; geÞ < 0 by ð24Þ:
So @Y ðqÞ=@q < 0; that is, Y ðqÞ is less likely to be positive when q is higher.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. The following conditions can be derived using similar arguments as
in section 3.1 and 3.2. If partners belong to the same community, the minimum
relationship building cost to maintain a long-term relational contract is
Rˆe[ ðb xeÞ=d age þ að1 qÞe; ð25Þ
and the cost of a short-term relational contract that automatically breaks up
when a new match becomes more productive is
R˜se[ ðb xeÞ=dq age; ð26Þ
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The short-term relational contract is more proﬁtable than the long-term ones
when
e > ðb xeÞ=dqa: ð27Þ
This part of the proof illustrates how to calculate R˜se, since the other conditions
can be obtained following exactly the same steps as in the text. When
e > ðb xeÞ=dqa, it is optimal to change partners when new matches become
more productive. If so, the cost of relationship building is different. Following
arguments in section 3.2, the value of a newly formed match is
V˜ye ¼ aþ dðqV˜ze þ

1 qV˜ne  R˜ne[ aþ dEVse;
where EVse is the expected continuation value, and
V˜ze ¼ a

1þ ge
þ dEVse ¼ age þ V˜ye;
V˜ne ¼ a

1þ eþ dEVse ¼ aeþ V˜ye:
So we get
V˜ye ¼ aþ dqage þ dð1 qÞðae R˜neÞ
1 d :
Lets check the possible one-shot deviation when the initial gain from trade is
a. In a new match, if an agent cooperates, the match will continue where he
gets V˜ye  R˜e. If he cheats, he gets a payoff of

aþ b xe
þ dEV˜ye  R˜e.
Note that the expected value of entering a new match EV˜ye is
EV˜ye ¼ qðV˜ye  R˜yeÞ þ

1 qV˜ne  R˜ne
¼ V˜ye þ

1 qae qR˜ye þ ð1 qÞR˜ne;
since the net value of starting a new match when the gain from trade is a is
V˜ye  R˜ye, which occurs with probability q, while with probability 1 q the
new match is more productive and yields a net value V˜ne  R˜ne. Cheating will
not happen when

aþ b xe

%V˜ye  dEV˜ye ¼ aþ dqaege þ dqR˜ye;
0aþ b xe%aþ dqaege þ dqR˜ye
0R˜ye 

b xe

dq age:
The same condition can also deter cheating when the initial gain from trade is
aþ e. So the minimum cost of using the short-term relational cost is
R˜se ¼ ðb xeÞ=dq age
when partners belong to the same community. In the basic model, there is no
community so that xe ¼ 0, and thus the short-term relational cost is
Rse ¼ b=dq age, which is larger than R˜se.
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The existence of social communities improves trade efﬁciencies in several
scenarios, which are summarized in the following table.
The beneﬁt of the second case in Table 2 is calculated as follows.
V˜ye  R˜se ¼ aþdqageþdð1qÞðaeR˜seÞ1d  R˜se
¼ að1þgeÞþdð1qÞaeð1dqÞðbxeÞ=dq
1d ;
Vye  R*e ¼ að1þgeÞ1d  b=d aeð1 qÞ;
V˜ye  R˜se 

Vye  R*e

¼ xed þ

e bxedqa

að1qÞ
1d :
Using short-term legal contracts enables agents to form partnerships with indi-
viduals from different communities in order to capture the higher gains from
trade. The net beneﬁt of doing so is
p˜

q; ge; xe; h

[ Vˆsye  c*e 

V˜ye  R˜se

¼ dð1qÞ½ahc
*
neþð1dqÞ½ðbxeÞ=dqage
1d  c*e
for an elite agent, where Vˆsye is the same as Vˆye in equation (15) except by
replacing e by eþ h. It is easy to see that @p˜ðq; ge; xe; hÞ=@xe < 0 holds, which
means that the beneﬁt of using legal contracts is lower when xe is higher or
when the communities are more effective in enforcing relational contracts.
Let q˜s denote the socially optimal legal quality and hs the threshold level of h
beyond which legal investment starts. The FOC for interior solutions is
rp˜1ðq˜s; ge; xe; hÞ þ ð1 rÞp˜1ðq˜s; gm; xm; hÞ  C#ðq˜sÞ ¼ 0; ð28Þ
where
p˜1

q˜s; ge; xe; h
	
¼ dð1 qÞ
1 d
@c*ne
@q
 @c
*
e
@q
¼ p1

q˜s; e; ge
	
as in the basic model. The second-order condition is also the same as before. So
q˜s is uniquely determined by equation (28). Based on it, we get the following
comparative statics:
@q˜s
@h
¼ 0; @q˜
s
@xe
¼ 0:
hs is determined by
Table 2. Trade Efficiencies Improved by Communities
Cases with community Basic model Benefit of community
e%bxedqa Vye  Rˆeðlong termÞ Vye  Re

long term xed
e 2

bxe
dqa ;
b
dqa

V˜ye  R˜seðshort termÞ Vye  Reðlong termÞ xed+ðe bxedqa Það1qÞ1d
e> bdqa V˜ye  R˜seðshort termÞ V˜ye  Rseðshort termÞ xedq
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rp˜ðq˜s; ge; xe; hsÞ þ ð1 rÞp˜ðq˜s; gm; xm; hsÞ  Cðq˜sÞ ¼ 0;
based on which we get
@hs
@xe
¼  rp˜3ðq˜
s; ge; xe; h
sÞ
rp˜4ðq˜s; ge; xe; hsÞ þ ð1 rÞp˜4ðq˜s; gm; xm; hsÞ > 0;
where p˜3 < 0 and p˜4 > 0 are indeed true as both c*e and c
*
ne are independent of
h and xe. Similarly @h
s=@xm > 0 holds. And h
s > es holds because
p˜ðq; ge; xe; hÞ < pðq; h; geÞ, which is implied by V˜ye  R˜se > Vye  R*e .
It is straightforward to see that the same comparative statics hold for both
majority rule and elite rule under similar arguments.
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